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Abstract 
Evaluation of a professional athlete’s performance for the purposes of compensation 
determination is difficult, especially when decision making may not follow the expected 
―instrumental rationality.‖  This paper will look to examine the factors, both productive and non-
productive, impacting an Offensive Lineman’s salary in the NFL.  The purpose of this study is to 
determine whether an offensive lineman’s salary is based on productive characteristics adhering 
to instrumental rationality, or whether the influence of non-productive characteristics influence 
salary as ultimately determined by team management.  Results indicate that players within the 
tackle position with earning salaries in the seventy-fifth percentile gain additional benefits for 
having more facial symmetry.    
 
Introduction 
Evaluation of a professional athlete’s performance for the purposes of compensation 
determination is difficult, especially when decision making in the professional sports 
environment may not follow the expected ―instrumental rationality.‖  Instrumental rationality is 
the belief that practical reasoning helps one decide how to do things, such as problem solve, 
resolve disputes or execute technical tasks, by considering the factors involved in a situation as 
variables to be controlled (Instrumental Rationality, 2011). In other words, instrumental 
rationality refers to how effectively one allocates his/her abilities, or in the case of professional 
athletes, his skills, toward accomplishing a certain goal (Hackfort). Given the severe 
consequences of failure, including loss of playing time and public humiliation, and the wealth of 
information on individual performance, economists expect professional athletes’ salary 
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determinants to follow instrumental rationality.  However, Berri (2007) found that decision-
making in professional sports may not always follow this theory.   
For example, in Moneyball, Lewis (2003) explains how decision makers in Major League 
Baseball undervalued a player’s on-base percentage. Lewis revealed that managers tend to 
overlook a player’s ability to successfully get on base.  It would be ―practical,‖ and thus follow 
instrumental rationality, to field a team with a high on base percentage since getting on base is 
the only way to score runs and thus win games. Yet in practice, managers sought number one 
recruits and big name hitters, none of which were proven on-base players. In the National 
Football League, Romer (2006) revealed that coaches were too conservative when choosing to 
go for it on fourth down.  More frequent fourth down conversion attempts would increase a 
team’s probability of winning as it provides one additional chance at reaching the first down 
marker.  In order to win football games, a team must out-score its opponent.  The only way to 
score points is to effectively transition the football down the field and the most common way of 
doing so is through first down conversions. Thus, this study indicates that the coaches’ decision 
not to go for it on fourth down is counterintuitive to his team’s goal of winning football games.  
While some research claims that decision-making in professional sports does not always 
follow instrumental rationality, this opinion has not been fully substantiated. Therefore, this 
research will attempt to understand management’s decision-making inputs related to player 
compensation in the professional sports setting.  More specifically, this paper will look to 
examine the factors, both productive and non-productive, impacting a professional athlete’s 
salary in the National Football League (NFL), particularly members of the offensive line.  The 
purpose of this study is to determine whether an offensive lineman’s salary is based on 
productive characteristics adhering to instrumental rationality, or whether the influence of non-
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productive characteristics influence salary as ultimately determined by team management.  
Furthermore, this paper will attempt to explain how salary is allocated across the offensive line 
and identify any salary premiums by position.  
Background 
 The offensive line is composed of five men: left tackle, left guard, center, right guard and 
right tackle.  This offensive unit has three essential jobs: First, the center, positioned in the 
middle of the line, initiates every offensive play by ―hiking‖ the football on the quarterback’s 
count. This is also called a ―snap.‖  The second role of the offensive line is to prevent the 
quarterback from being ―sacked.‖  A sack occurs when the other team’s defense successfully 
tackles the quarterback before he has a chance to make a play on the ball.  A sack results in a loss 
of yardage making it more difficult for the offense to reach the first down marker
1
.  A sack may 
also put unnecessary strain or injury to the quarterback that may prove to be detrimental to the 
entire offense.  The majority of sacks originate from the area just outside the offensive line; 
therefore, it is the job of the left and right tackles, who line up on opposite far sides of the line, to 
be aware of any defensive movement or ―blitzes
2
‖ that may result in a sack.  Finally, the 
offensive line must refrain from committing penalties as penalties set the offense further back 
from the original line of scrimmage.  A ―hold‖ and a ―false start‖ are two of the most common 
penalties committed by offensive linemen. A holding penalty, which occurs when a player 
illegally blocks another player, results in a loss of 10 yards.  A false start, or an illegal movement 
prior to the snap, results in a loss of five yards. 
                                                          
1
 The offense is allotted four attempts to move the ball 10 yards.  If they have failed to do so after their third attempt, 
the team will typically elect to punt the ball or kick a field goal if within range to avoid turning the ball over on 
downs.  
2 A blitz occurs when defensive players lined up on or behind the line of scrimmage burst across the line to the 
offensive side in an attempt to tackle the quarterback or interfere with his pass attempt.  
P a g e  | 5 
 
 In order to effectively do their job, offensive linemen must be big.  In 2009, senior 
analyst Jeremy Kaufman stated ―in the contemporary NFL, it is almost impossible for a lineman 
under the playing weight of 290 pounds to make it in the league, regardless of talent level‖ 
(Bleacher Report).  In fact, every offensive lineman included in the 2010 dataset exceeded 300 
pounds.  Kaufman goes on to claim that the natural weights of these massive human beings range 
between 200 and 230 pounds.  This begs the question: At what point does the size of an 
offensive linemen become detrimental to his performance and his health?  Thus, a second 
question this paper will address will be whether or not there is a turning point when weight 
becomes a non-productive characteristic for an offensive lineman.   
Weight of offensive linemen has been discussed in popular press as well.  In 2006, 
Scripps Howard determined that heavyset football players were twice as likely to die by the age 
of 50 compared to their lower weight teammates. Moreover, compared to the standard 
population, offensive linemen have a 52% increased risk of death from heart disease (Hargrove). 
Fall 2001 The Biggest Loser contestant, Antone Davis, former offensive lineman for the 
Philadelphia Eagles and Atlanta Falcons, is testimony to the weight struggles of offensive 
linemen.  Before retiring in 1997, Davis weighed 335 pounds.  Nearly 15 years later, Davis 
weighed into this season’s The Biggest Loser at 447 pounds.  When describing his motivations 
for joining the reality show, Davis laments ―All my friends are literally falling dead.‖
3
 After 
attending the funerals of seven former offensive line teammates from the University of 
Tennessee, all of whom were younger and weighed less than him, Davis realized that he needed 
to lose weight or he would be next.  
For Minnesota Vikings’ offensive linemen Bryant McKinnie weight cost him his job. 
Despite being a Pro Bowl player, the Minnesota Vikings released McKinnie in 2011 when he 
                                                          
3 The Biggest Loser, NBC’s reality weight loss show (Season 12) 
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showed up to pre-season weighing 387 pounds, 85 pounds more than he weighed the previous 
season (O, Mike).  This move suggests that Minnesota viewed McKinnie’s weight as 
unfavorable toward his ability to effectively protect the quarterback.  However, the Baltimore 
Ravens disagreed.  Baltimore quickly signed the Pro Bowler, now weighing 360 pounds, and 
gave him Michael Oher’s coveted position at left tackle (Corbett). Again we ask how much is too 
much.  At what weight does an offensive lineman’s size inhibit him from effectively allocating 
his skills to contribute to the team’s goal of winning football games? 
Literature Review 
Productive Determinates of Salary 
Academic literature on the offensive line is scarce, thus the majority of supportive 
literature will come from studies conducted in other professional sports arenas including the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL).  Berri, 
Humphreys and Simmons (2011) examined the determinants of salaries of offensive linemen in 
the NFL.  Their research focused primarily on the position of starting left tackle and the 
phenomena of the ―blind side‖ as made popular by Michael Lewis’ novel The Blind Side: 
Evolution of a Game, in addition to other performance-based salary determinants including 
penalty yards, size and draft position.  The authors observed salary distributions that were highly 
skewed to the left with few players earning substantially more than others. This study found that 
on average, offensive linemen (center, tackle or guard) earn $1.7 million.  The results of his 
research also point to a salary hierarchy among the specialized positions on the line with tackles 
earning the most, followed by guards, centers then general offensive linemen
4
.   
                                                          
4
 A general offensive lineman is a player who can play any position on the line.  
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The researchers observed that starting left tackles earned $3.49 million on average.  
While this average is above that of the line as a whole, the dummy variable for starting left tackle 
was found to be insignificant, which would suggest that being a starting left tackle does not 
consistently impact salary. More specifically, at the 25
th
 quantile, starting left tackles do not earn 
significantly more than regular tackles. However, at the median and 75
th
 quantile, a significant 
pay increase is observed for starting left tackles above tackles as a whole.  This inconsistency 
may be attributed to the narrowness of the study. The researchers solely looked at starting left 
tackles; however, if the quarterback is left-handed, protecting his blindside becomes the job of 
the starting right tackle. While there are currently just five active left-handed quarterbacks in the 
league, the quarterback’s handedness remains an important consideration. Regardless, the 
researchers show a consistent salary premium for starting left tackles in the majority of quantile 
analyses, as well as a salary distribution with the majority of starting left tackles in the top fifty 
percent of the distribution. These results suggest that Lewis’ story of The Blind Side holds true – 
starting left tackles are valued higher than the rest of the line and their salary reflects this notion 
ceteris paribus.    
Berri, Humphreys and Simmons’ (2011) research on draft selection uncovered that initial 
perceptions—typical drivers of draft selection—remain influential on salary even after 
observations of player performance in the NFL. According to the free agency established by the 
NFL, following a draft, rookie players are expected to remain with his team for at least three 
years. After three years, a player becomes a free agent, at which point he is free to sign a new 
contract with any interested team in the league or renegotiate his current contract based recent 
performance. Therefore, for the first three years of a player’s career, his salary is highly 
dependent on draft selection.  These researchers found that offensive linemen, in particular, with 
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free agent status and more than three years of experience with the same team earn more than 
other players ceteris paribus.  Furthermore, offensive linemen who switch teams suffer a salary 
penalty.  A possible explanation for this trend may be the fact that an effective offensive line 
serves as a cohesive unit, one which compliments each player’s strengths and weaknesses.  Thus, 
a lineman who frequently switches teams fails to establish the necessary cohesion with the rest of 
the line and is therefore less effective, which is reflected in his lower salary.     
Berri, Brook and Schmidt (2007) noticed similar trends in draft position and free agency 
in the NBA.  After the first two years of a NBA player’s career, his draft position was still 
influential on the amount of playing time he receives, regardless of prior performance. Therefore, 
despite disappointing performance, coaches will continue to reward high-draft picks with more 
playing time than other players simply based on their position in the draft. This suggests that 
NBA decision makers are slow to adapt to fresh information on player performance.  These 
researchers also analyzed salary determinants in the NBA.  In particular, they observed recent 
free agents to overcome the lag year between player performance and salary determination
5
.  It is 
beneficial to study free agents since their new team salary is based on their most recent 
performance as one does not need to compensate for multi-year contracts or signing bonuses. By 
restricting the sample space to free agents, these researchers found points scored to be the most 
important performance statistic. In fact, when points scored per game is used as the sole measure 
of player performance; one can explain 59% of a player’s average salary. Again, the researchers 
found that negative performance, including inaccurate shooting and turnovers, does not 
negatively impact salary.  
                                                          
5
 A free agent is a professional athlete whose current contract has expired and is now eligible to sign a contract with 
another team. 
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In addition to draft selection and free agency status, Berri, Humphreys and Simmons 
(2011) studied the effects of sack prevention on an offensive lineman’s salary. Consistent with 
the aforementioned research conducted by Berri, Brook and Schmidt (2007) on the NBA, these 
researchers concluded that a lineman’s negative performance—his inability to prevent sacks—
has no impact on salary.  The authors propose two possible explanations for this outcome.  First, 
it is possible that the other explanatory variables in the model, including Pro Bowl status and a 
player who remains with his team for at least three years, already account for a player’s ability to 
prevent sacks. More specifically, Pro Bowl status indicates a successful career and success on the 
line is characterized by effective quarterback protection including sack prevention. Furthermore, 
sack prevention is typically a function of the entire line’s ability to hold off the opposition.  
Therefore, team longevity contributes to offensive line cohesion, ultimately increasing the line’s 
ability to prevent sacks. Second, since the act of preventing a sack may be seen as the job of the 
whole line, assigning sacks allowed to an individual lineman may not be an appropriate method 
of assessing salary across the offensive line.   
Given the overall findings of Berri, Humphreys and Simmons’ (2011) study, the authors 
conclude that the salary model used is similar to the neoclassical model of worker compensation 
since the variation in NFL salaries can be explained by the same factors that explain the variation 
in factory workers’, teachers’ and doctors’ salaries.  Moreover, since the number of sack yards 
allowed was found to be insignificant in explaining salary, this model may specifically explain 
worker compensation in a group setting.  Since the linemen must work together to achieve the 
desired output (i.e. hold off the defense allowing the offense to obtain a first down), this model 
would similarly demonstrate the collaboration necessary of factory workers on an assembly line 
or a surgical team to achieve their desired outcome. 
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As previously mentioned, the success of the offensive line depends on their ability to 
work as a unit.  Idson and Kahane’s (2000) research on the team effects of compensation will be 
utilized as a basis to theoretically determine whether individual characteristics are valued 
differently across different work environments. The researchers found that individual 
productivity can vary in different settings since the level of coworker assistance varies by setting. 
For an individual in an environment where there exists some level of complimentarity in human 
capital efforts, it is possible that productivity is a function of both team and individual inputs; as 
a result, his compensation may also be a function of both inputs. 
 Unlike any other position in the NFL, including the defensive linemen, the offensive 
linemen are most often evaluated as a unit.  One only has to watch a football game to hear 
references about the performance of ―the offensive line‖ rather than ―an offensive lineman.‖ As 
such, it is very difficult to find individual statistics for these players.  Because of this,  it is 
important to analyze whether or not the salary determinants of the offensive linemen are more 
closely affected by one another’s performance opposed to strictly their own.  Using the NHL as 
the basis for their study, Idson and Kahane (2000) found that when team productive statistics 
were included in the salary model, it had a higher adjusted R
2
; therefore, these variables did a 
better job explaining the variation in individual player compensation.  Adding prolific scorers, 
intense two-way plays, swift skaters and star players into the model increased salary, suggests 
that a player’s salary is affected by the attributes of the rest of the players on the team. 
Furthermore, the authors established positive correlation between a player’s career points and his 
presence on the ice during a full-strength goal
6
.  Therefore, members of teams with high 
                                                          
6
 A full-strength goal occurs when a team scores with all 6 players on the ice.  In other words, there are no members 
of the scoring team sitting in the penalty box at the time of the goal.  Therefore, presence on the ice during a full-
strength goal may be a way to measure team cohesiveness, as a full-strength goal requires the combined effort of all 
six men on the ice. 
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productivity, as characterized by factors such as high scorers, star players and skilled skaters, 
receive greater compensation.  These results further support the claim that individual 
productivity, and therefore individual salaries, are valued higher on teams with better players.  
Thus, their labor inputs are viewed as complements.  Moreover, the authors state that some 
positions are expected to be more compatible than others, which may lead to more significantly 
positive interactions. The offensive line positions—tackle, guard and center—may be considered 
highly compatible. As such, this paper will seek to establish the statistical significance of their 
interactions and the corresponding effects on individual salaries.  
Based on these results, Idson and Kahane (2000) concluded that team attributes have both 
direct and indirect effects on individual player compensation as seen by the varied salaries 
rewarded for individual productivity.  While inclusion of team attributes in the model increased 
the overall explanatory power of the model, certain individual productive variables declined, 
including games-squared, points scored, penalties against, height, star status, forward position 
and free agent status. Wherefore, the researchers concluded that the explanatory power of 
individual attributes may be overvalued when team effects are excluded from the model.   
Non-productive Determinates of Salary 
In addition to the productive statistics influencing salary, it is beneficial to consider any 
non-productive forces that may explain player compensation. In 2011, Simmons, Berri, 
VanGilder and O’Neill (2011) looked at the non-productive determinants, namely physical 
attractiveness, affecting salaries in the NFL.  The researchers defined attractiveness as a physical 
characteristic representing greater facial symmetry.  Facial symmetry is distinguished by 
balanced lateral proportions.  In general, superior attractiveness is correlated with observed 
outcomes. The researchers restricted their study to NFL quarterbacks as players in this role are 
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often team leaders and the ―face of the franchise.‖  Therefore, one would perceive quarterbacks 
as more physically attractive than positions with less media exposure. This perception is 
consistent with the mere exposure effect, which is a psychological phenomenon where people 
naturally prefer people or objects simply based on familiarity (Fournier). Given this research and 
the mere exposure effect, this paper will attempt to explain how the physical appearance of 
offensive linemen, typically characterized by their obese frames and mean facades, impacts their 
salaries.   
Revisiting Simmons, Berri, VanGilder and O’Neill’s (2011) research on quarterbacks, the 
researchers found, using an online program, Symmeter, to measure attractiveness, that facial 
symmetry of quarterbacks ranged from 90.36 to 99.77.  This range is consistently above the 
attractive measure of the average person which falls at the top of the 80
th
 percentile.  Moreover, 
symmetry was found to have a positive impact on salary with a coefficient of 0.089 at the 95% 
confidence level.  Therefore, a unit increase in facial symmetry increases salary by 8.9%.   
Furthermore, moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation 
above the mean, or an increase of 3.16 points on the Symmeter reading, increases expected 
salary by 11.8%.   Given these results, attractiveness, as a non-productive characteristic, 
increases a quarterback’s salary regardless of performance.   
Additional research by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) showed that more attractive people 
earn greater salaries than their average looking counterparts, thus creating a 5% wage premium.  
Mobius and Rosenblatt (2006) also found that attractive people earn higher salaries, mainly due 
to their better communication skills. In their research, Mocan and Tekin (2010) cite a variety of 
reasons why attractive people may be perceived as more productive or competent in the labor 
market as is suggested by their consistently higher wages. First, these researchers claimed that 
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attractive people naturally have more self-confidence, in addition to possessing better leadership 
and social skills. Second, more attractive individuals may have higher self-esteem and 
motivation.  Greater levels of motivation in school, as well as during human capital attainment 
throughout the development of one’s career may also contribute to his higher compensation.  
Salary Model 
 The model of linemen salaries used herein is based on the basic Mincer ―human capital 
earnings function‖ often utilized to model earnings regressions.  Mincer originally designed the 
model to have the log of earnings dependent on the sum of years of education and a quadratic of 
years of potential experience following:  
 




where y is earnings, 0 is the earnings of an individual with no education and no experience, Si is 
the years of schooling and Xi is years of experience in the labor market (Lemieux 2006). When 
applied to sports literature, this form often depends on experience, player performance and team 
characteristics (see Berri, Humphreys and Simmons (2011) for references to evidence across 
various sports settings).   Applying the idea of instrumental rationality introduced at the onset of 
this paper, experience, player performance and team characteristics are all factors that contribute 
to the practical reasoning coaches use to determine players’ salaries. 
Human capital is often defined as an investment in education, training, health, or mobility 
(Becker, 2008).  According to Becker, an individual’s accumulation of knowledge and training 
affects his or her ability to perform specific tasks.  Furthermore, his human capital theory asserts 
that the more knowledgeable an individual is, the more valuable he becomes in the workforce 
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thus warranting his higher salary. A lineman’s knowledge base is primarily made up of his on the 
job training, which emphasizes physical health and fitness, studying the playbook, etc.  More 
generally, this model will depend on experience, health and individual player performance. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of salary. NFL players generally receive a base 
salary, a signing bonus, and other bonuses both performance and non-performance related.  
Signing bonuses are paid within the first year of the player signing the contract.  In the NFL, pay 
scales are experience driven, salaries are not typically guaranteed and players can be released 
from their contracts at any moment.  The dependent variable will be a summation of the 
following three salary inputs: Base Salary, Signing Bonus, Other Bonus. Table 1 outlines 
descriptions of each variable that will be used in the study.  
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
Weight Lineman's weight in pounds 
NFL Experience Total number of seasons played in the NFL 
First Round Pick Dummy variable indicating that the lineman was drafted in the first round 
Second Round Pick Dummy variable indicating that the lineman was drafted in the second round 
Third Round Pick Dummy variable indicating that the lineman was drafted in the third round 
Undrafted Dummy variable indicating that the lineman was undrafted 
Games Played Number of games played per season 
Games Started Number of games started per season 
Total Penalties Number of total penalties per season 
Penalty Yards Number of total penalty yards per season 
False Start Number of false starts per season 
Hold Number of holding penalties per season 
Sacks Allowed Number of sacks allowed per season 
Yards Lost by Sack Total yards lost by sack per season 
Base Salary Lineman's base salary per season 
Signing Bonus Lineman's signing bonus per season 
Other Bonus Lineman's other bonuses awarded per season 
Total Salary Lineman's total salary per season 
Symmetry Measure of facial symmetry used to represent physical attractiveness 
P a g e  | 15 
 
The first explanatory variable is NFL Experience. As the human capital model suggests, 
experience is expected to have a positive impact on lineman salary.  With each additional year in 
the NFL, a player becomes more comfortable and knowledgeable about the game thus making 
him a more valuable asset to the team justifying his salary increase. However, at a certain point, 
one expects to see diminishing returns to an additional year of experience due to the physical 
demands of the sport.  After years of extensive wear and tear on the body, one’s speed and 
strength begin to decline ultimately decreasing his productivity.  The quadratic variable, NFL 
Experience squared, captures the diminishing returns to experience.  
College performance paves the way for experience in the NFL. Successful collegiate 
football players are in high demand, a demand which is highlighted each year in the NFL draft 
selection process. There are seven rounds to the NFL draft.  Players drafted in the first round are 
considered to be of the highest quality.  Therefore, early draft picks are expected to have the 
highest salaries.  Using the lower draft rounds as a benchmark, First Round Pick is expected to 
have a positive impact on salary. The dataset also includes the dummy variable, Undrafted, to 
represent players who were undrafted. These players are expected to have the lowest salaries and 
a negative impact on salary compared to the benchmark of a drafted player.  
A player’s size, a key variable of interest in this study, is measured by Weight.  As weight 
increases, salary is expected to increase since massive linemen are more effective blockers; 
however, at a certain point a one pound increase in weight is expected to decrease salary as 
linemen who are too massive lose agility, quickness and consequently their ability to 
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The non-productive variable, Symmetry, will also be used to explain linemen salaries. 
Based on Simmons, Berri, VanGilder and O’Neill’s (2011) research on NFL quarterbacks, 
players with high levels of facial symmetry, a measure of physical attractiveness, are expected to 
earn a salary premium over their less attractive teammates.  Therefore, it is expected that facial 
symmetry will positively impact salary.  
The productive statistics for offensive linemen make up the rest of the explanatory 
variables in the model. These variables represent the player’s individual performance in the NFL. 
It is expected that linemen salaries will be highly influenced by their success on the field.  For 
example, success in sports is often rewarded with increased playing time.  Therefore, the 
variables Games Played and Games Started are expected to be positively correlated with salary.  
One’s salary is also affected by his ability to perform his job duties.  For offensive linemen such 
duties include preventing the other team’s defense from sacking the quarterback and helping the 
offense gain a first down.  Effective blocking is the most useful way to achieve this goal. 
Ineffective blocking is represented by the number of sacks allowed by the offensive linemen.  If 
the defense successfully penetrates the offensive line and reaches the quarterback, the play 
typically results in a loss of yards.  Consequently, the offense now has one less play and farther 
to go to obtain the ten yards required for a first down.  A lineman’s ability to prevent sacks in a 
given season is represented by the variables Sacks Allowed and Yards Lost by Sack. Penalties 
also result in a loss of yards.  A holding penalty or illegal use of the hands, arms or body results 
in a loss of ten yards.  A false start is penalized with a loss of five yards.  The following variables 
capture a lineman’s penalty history: Total Penalties, Penalty Yards, False Start and Hold.  Given 
the consequences of sacks and penalties, all six of these performance variables are expected to 
negatively impact salary.  
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Data Description 
 This data set consists of performance data, player characteristics and salary figures for 
starting offensive linemen in the NFL spanning the 2000 to 2010 regular seasons.  A starting 
offensive lineman was determined by any player whose games played equaled the number of 
games started. Player characteristics and performance statistics came from various online sources 
including the official NFL website, ajc.stats.com, and Pro-Football-Reference.com. The majority 
of salary information came from USAToday.com.  Due to the absence of a salary cap during the 
2010 season, salary data for this timeframe is difficult to obtain and will come from different 
sources on a team-by-team basis if available
7
. There are a total of 1,233 observations in this 
dataset containing detailed information on 360 unique offensive linemen. Each observation 
contains data on an individual offensive lineman in a given season. Table 2 contains summary 
statistics for each explanatory variable in the dataset.  
  
                                                          
7
 The old collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not require teams to report salaries to the National Football 
League Players Association (NFLPA) in the same way it does today; therefore, the primary data source has dried 
up in some cases (Kevin Quinn). 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Weight 313.371 15.856 234 375 
NFL Experience 6.655 3.059 1.000 19.000 
First Round Pick 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Second Round Pick 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Third Round Pick 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Undrafted 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Games Played 14.49 3.15 1 16 
Games Started 14.49 3.15 1 16 
Total Penalties 4.38 2.95 0 17 
Penalty Yards 31.85 21.93 0 169 
False Starts 2.32 2.17 0 13 
Holds 1.46 1.42 0 8 
Sacks Allowed 3.85 2.82 0 17 
Sack Yards Allowed 24.44 19.30 0 114 
Base Salary 1,444,888 1,381,025 0.00 12,690,000 
Signing Bonus 1,412,875 2,591,551 0.00 16,000,000 
Other Bonuses 382,421 1,035,596 0.00 12,217,280 
Total Salary 2,819,742 2,686,887 277,778 20,200,000 
Symmetry 97.858 2.312 74.568 99.765 
 
 The average starting offensive lineman in the NFL earns $2.8 million dollars.  Orlando 
Pace, starting left tackle for the St. Louis Rams, earns the highest salary.  In 2008, this number 
one, first round draft pick earned $20.2 million dollars. Note that the salary distribution is not 
normal. Graph 1 illustrates that it is highly skewed to the left. In reference to draft selection, it is 
important to note that 25% of the offensive linemen in this dataset were drafted in the first round, 
20% in the second round and 13% in the third round.  Fifteen percent of the offensive linemen 
were undrafted.   
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Graph 1: Salary Distribution of Starting Offensive Linemen in the NFL 
 
Of the 16 regular season games, the average offensive lineman played in and started 14.5 
games.  To qualify for inclusion in the dataset, an offensive lineman had to have at least started 
in one regular season game, establishing an acceptable range for Games Played and Games 
Started from one to 16.  The decision to include only starters in this model was made in an effort 
to decrease the variance in salary and productive statistics, including total penalties and sacks. In 
order to have all the necessary performance statistics, an offensive lineman needed at least one 
year of experience in the NFL to quality for the study. Ray Brown of the Washington Redskins 
and Bruce Matthews of the Tennessee Titans were the most experienced linemen with 19 years 
in the league.  The average offensive lineman had approximately six and a half years of 
experience, which is consistent with the expected length of an NFL player’s career according to 







































































































































































































































































































P a g e  | 20 
 
 A characteristic of particular interest in this study is the size of the offensive linemen.  
Given their job description—protecting the quarterback or ball carrier from massive defensive 
players—the offensive linemen must be equally enormous. Due to high levels of muscle mass in 
professional athletes, researchers, including Berri, Humphreys and Simmons, typically use Body 
Mass Index (BMI) as a measure of an athlete’s size. Body Mass Index combines a player’s size 
and strength in the following ratio: weight divided by height-squared, the sum multiplied by 703 
(What Health?).  The average BMI of an adult male ranges between 20 and 25.  A BMI between 
25 and 30 classifies as overweight and a BMI above 30 labels a person obese.  The average 
offensive lineman in this dataset had a BMI of 37.669, falling into the obese category. Mike 
Schneck, center for the Pittsburgh Steelers, was the smallest offensive lineman with a BMI of 
30.9 (234 lbs.), and Chris Dishman, offensive lineman for the Arizona Cardinals, was the largest 
offensive lineman with a BMI of 46.9 (375 lbs.).  While increased muscle mass in male athletes 
naturally increases their BMI, given the recent health concerns for overweight offensive linemen, 
BMIs of this magnitude may be a cause for some concern.  On the other hand, researchers from 
Michigan State University suggest that it may be necessary to recalculate the normal, overweight 
and obese thresholds based on athlete and non-athlete populations.  Ode, Pivarnik, Reeves and 
Knous (2007) proposed setting the upper limit for a normal BMI at 27.9.  Furthermore, the team 
of researchers specifically identified football linemen as extra large individuals and concluded 
that their appropriate BMI is around 34.1, which is still below the average linemen’s BMI in this 
dataset.  Given the uncertainty surrounding male athletes and BMI, this research will use weight 
as a proxy for size. The average offensive lineman weighs 313 pounds.  
 The explanatory power of a player’s physical attractiveness on salary is another area of 
concentration in this research. Using facial symmetry as a measure of physical attractiveness, the 
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average lineman has a symmetry reading of 97.858, approximately 10% above the national 
average, classifying offensive linemen as very attractive individuals.  With a symmetry reading 
of 99.86, Brett Romberg, an undrafted center who received $649,680 in 2008, was determined to 
be the most attractive lineman. These numbers appear inconsistent with expectations since 
Simmons, Berri, VanGilder and O’Neill (2011) and Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) showed that 
more attractive individuals receive salary premiums over their less attractive peers. Moreover, 
Polumbus’ symmetry reading makes him technically more attractive than any of the quarterbacks 
in the aforementioned research, including Tom Brady.  
Also included in the dataset are six measures of negative performance for offensive 
linemen. For each player, there are statistics on the total number of penalties, false starts and 
holds, the number of penalty yards, the number of sacks allowed and the total number of yards 
lost due to a sack.  On average, an offensive lineman was penalized four times for an average of 
32 lost yards.  The offensive linemen averaged 2.3 false starts and just 1.5 holding penalties per 
season.  In an average season, the offensive linemen gave up almost four sacks for a loss of 24.4 
yards.  However, the ranges for each of these variables are large, indicating that their means may 
be heavily influenced by the players with little playing time and consequently fewer penalties.  
For example, one player committed 169 yards in total penalties, while another allowed 17 sacks 
in a single season. 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 3 shows the log-linear regression results based on 1,233 observations of starting 
offensive linemen in the NFL. This regression took into consideration season, individual 
performance statistics, experience and non-productive variables such as facial symmetry and 
weight. The Adjusted R
2
 for this regression was 0.2243 signifying that 22.43% of the variation in 
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salary is explained by the variables in the model.  The Durbin Watson hypothesis test and graph 
of the model’s residuals indicate that there is no serial correlation in the model. The DW statistic 
was 1.983, which is statistically close to 2 and there was no pattern identified in the graph of the 
residuals.  The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) show that there is a high degree of 
multicollinearity between the season dummy variables, as well as weight and weight-squared. 
However, these variables will be left in the model because they make theoretical sense. Omitting 
them may cause bias in the model. Finally, the significance of the Chi Square hypothesis test 
shows that the model suffers from heteroskedasticity, which suggests that there may be omitted 
variable bias. This result is not surprising given the large dispersion in salary along the line. To 
correct for this, ACOV was added to the regression. See Table 6 and 7 in Appendix A.  
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Table 3: Log-Linear Regression – Parameter Estimates and t-Statistics  
Variable Parameter Estimate t-Statistic 
2001 Season 0.861 1.35 
2002 Season 0.726 1.14 
2003 Season 0.794 1.24 
2004 Season 0.851 1.33 
2005 Season 0.792 1.23 
2006 Season 1.027 1.60 
2007 Season 0.964 1.50 
2008 Season 1.175 * 1.83 
2009 Season 1.014 1.58 
Games Played 0.048 *** 5.71 
NFL Experience 0.109 *** 11.82 
Symmetry 0.021 * 1.91 
Total Penalty Yards -0.002 * -1.69 
Sack Yards Allowed -0.003 * -1.90 
First Round Draft Pick 0.442 *** 7.29 






Center 0.034 0.36 
Guard 0.120 1.36 
Tackle 0.408 *** 4.79 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 
 The results indicate that the more games an offensive lineman starts, the higher salary he 
earns holding everything else constant. More specifically, for every additional game played in 
the previous season, an offensive lineman will see a 4.8% increase to his current salary. This 
result follows the expectation that coaches want their best players in every game, and therefore; 
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the number of games played is indicative of a player’s perceived skill level, which is ultimately 
represented in his salary as supported by the human capital theory.  
 The human capital theory also supports the fact that offensive linemen drafted in the first 
round receive a salary premium over their fellow linemen either drafted in a lower round or 
undrafted. A player drafted in the first round is perceived to be one of the most skilled and 
knowledgeable new players on the market. As expected from theory and prior research on the 
NBA, these players are duly compensated for their talents. In this regression, a first round draft 
pick receives a 44.2% salary premium.  
However, in contrast to Berri, Brook and Schmidt’s NBA research and Berri, Humphreys 
and Simmons’ (2011) research on the offensive line, which concluded that negative performance 
had no impact on salary, these new results suggest that negative performance actually hurts a 
lineman’s salary. The results indicate that the summation of total penalty yards and sack yards 
allowed against one’s quarterback negatively impact salary. For every additional penalty yard 
committed by an offensive lineman, his salary is decreased by 0.2%. Similarly, for every 
additional sack yard allowed against the quarterback, an offensive lineman sees a 0.3% decrease 
to his salary. 
Experience also matters. With every additional year of experience, an offensive 
lineman’s salary increases by 10.9%. There was no significant turning point for experience 
identified in this model. In previous offensive linemen research, Berri, Humphreys and Simmons 
(2011) found that the turning points for offensive linemen ranged from 9-12 at various quantiles. 
The average experience level of an offensive lineman in this dataset was 6.7 years with a 
standard deviation of 3.05, which puts the average turning point just out of reach of one standard 
deviation.  
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Consistent with other NFL research, the results indicate that tackles receive salary 
premiums, specifically 40.8%, over other positions on the line. There are a couple theories 
supporting this conclusion. First, depending on the handedness of the quarterback, one job of a 
tackle is to protect the quarterback’s blind side. Given the importance of the quarterback in 
leading the entire offense, ensuring his safety may be perceived as the most important job of the 
entire line, a duty falling primarily to the tackle who is responsible for sealing off the outsides. 
Second, given the significance of the tackle’s job, this position often receives the most attention. 
NBA researchers observed that player evaluation relies heavily on visual observation, i.e. 
scoring, rather than analysis of performance statistics. Scoring in the NBA may be equated to 
shutting down the massive defensive end on the opposing team who is attempting to rush the 
outside and attack the quarterback
8
.This highly visible play may contribute to a tackle’s salary 
premium.  
As for the impact of facial symmetry on the salary of an offensive lineman, the results 
indicate that symmetry is significant at the 10% level. Therefore, offensive linemen are rewarded 
for their physical attractiveness regardless of their performance on the field. More specifically, 
for every additional degree of facial symmetry, as measured by Symmeter, an offensive lineman 
sees a 2.1% increase to his salary. This result violates both instrumental rationality and common 
perceptions of offensive linemen. First, the significance of symmetry suggests that team 
management considers more than just one’s observed performance when making salary 
decisions. The consideration of physical attractiveness may be regarded as an impractical 
determinant of salary as it has no impact on a lineman’s ability to do his job (i.e. protect the 
quarterback). Second, as previously mentioned, offensive linemen are known for their obese 
                                                          
8 The defensive end is typically the fastest, most athletic player on the defense. As a result, he usually has 
the most sacks, making him a quarterback’s worst nightmare. 
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frames and mean facades.  However, this result suggests that not only is the average offensive 
lineman 10% more attractive than the average male, but he earns a 2% salary premium over his 
less attractive teammates on the line. While this result is less than the salary premium of 
quarterbacks at 11.8%, it does suggest that offensive linemen may hold some sort of leadership 
role on the team and they do receive a certain amount of media exposure, for which they are duly 
compensated.   Additionally, while an offensive lineman’s size was of particular interest in this 
study weight was found to be insignificant suggesting that the size of an offensive lineman as no 
impact on his salary. 
 Given the wide salary dispersion in the model, a quantile regression technique was 
implemented.  A quantile regression compensates for any outliers and allows comparisons and 
conclusions to be drawn about players who are more similar to one another on the salary scale. 
Quantile regressions can be used to compliment and or improve on Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions, like the first one presented in this paper. The results of this regression are found in 
Table 4. 
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*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 
 
The results indicate that like the log-linear regression, experience, the number of games 
played, and being a first round draft pick remain significant variables in the determination of 






 quantiles at the 1% level.  While tackles consistently earn the 
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highest salary premium across all quantiles, the results of this regression also suggest that guards 







Only at the 25
th
 quantile do centers see a significant salary premium above generic offensive 
linemen. Interestingly, the 25
th
 quantile results indicate an earnings hierarchy that conflicts with 
Berri, Humphreys and Simmons’ research which found the following hierarchy: tackles, guards, 
centers, offensive linemen. On the other hand, this result suggests that tackles earn the highest 
salary premium (52.6%), followed by centers (28.1%), then guards (20.4%), and finally the 
generic offensive linemen ceteris paribus. Despite this result, the average salaries by position 
support the earnings hierarchy previously presented by Berri, Humphreys and Simmons. It is 
possible that the result is being skewed by the high percentage of centers in the 25
th
 percentile. 
The average salary of a center in this dataset was $3 million and the predicted value of the mean 
at the 25
th
 percentile was $992,418.  
Regarding the performance statistics, only total penalty yards was significant at the 1% 
level in the 25
th
 quantile. This suggests that observed individual performance has no impact on 
salary determination for players in the upper half of the earnings scale. On the other hand, the 
results indicate that symmetry matters most for the top 50% of offensive linemen. This result 
may be explained by the fact that the ―best‖ offensive linemen earn the highest salaries, get the 
most playing time and consequently more face time. As previous research suggests, management 
awards players for being more physically attractive when they have a higher probability of being 
in the limelight.  
 
Conclusion 
The results of this research find that both productive and non-productive factors explain 
the variation in an offensive lineman’s salary. At the lower ends of the salary spectrum, observed 
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performance, as measured by negative productivity, is significant to the determination of a 
player’s salary from year to year. At the upper end of the spectrum, non-performance related 
factors, such as facial symmetry, become significant. Weight, however, was found to be 
insignificant across all quantiles. This suggests that team management is not concerned with an 
offensive lineman’s weight, but rather his performance on the field and how he presents himself 
in the media spotlight.  
Table 5: Salary Dispersion of Offensive Line Positions 
 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Center 2,355,624 101,606 15,007,150 
Guard 2,542,798 172,000 17,006,240 
Tackle 2,543,130 284,000 18,000,000 
 
Given the salary dispersion across the line (see Table 5), it is possible that the offensive 
line is not the cohesive unit it was initially perceived to be. In fact, conflict amongst linemen is 
possible as certain players on the lower end of the salary scale rely heavily on their individual 
performance and the ability of the line to work together, while their higher paid teammates have 
less pressure to perform.  Furthermore, the observed earnings hierarchy may contribute added 
conflict amongst teammates. In 2010, Michael Oher and Marshal Yanda of the Baltimore Ravens 
lined up on the right end of the Ravens offensive line. At tackle, Oher earned $15.7 million. To 
his right, Yanda, at guard, earned $1.7 million.  The $14 million gap separating these two players 
could understandably be a high point of contention and lead to decreased cooperation between 
teammates. In order to increase camaraderie across the line, team management may need to look 
into closing the gap between the linemen’s salaries.  
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Table 6: Statistical Tests for Serial Correlation 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
 
Dependent Variable: lnsalary 
 
Durbin-Watson D                1.983 
Number of Observations          1124 
1st Order Autocorrelation      0.009 
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                     Plot of resid*Residlag.  Legend: A = 1 obs, B = 2 obs, etc. 
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  DW ~ 2 
No pattern in the graph of the residuals 
 
Thus, no serial correlation 
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Table 7: Statistical Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
           The REG Procedure 
             Model: MODEL1 
      Dependent Variable: lnsalary 
                                     
 Test of First and Second 
                                        
   Moment Specification 
   
      DF    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
     168        217.32        0.0062 
 
 
The REG Procedure 
                                          Model: MODEL1 
                                  Dependent Variable: lnsalary 
 
                      Number of Observations Read                       1233 
                      Number of Observations Used                       1124 
                      Number of Observations with Missing Values         109 
 
 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                              Sum of           Mean 
          Source                 DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
          Model                  20      236.08768       11.80438      17.23    <.0001 
          Error                  1103      755.58659        0.68503 
          Corrected Total        1123      991.67427 
 
 
                       Root MSE              0.82766    R-Square     0.2381 
                       Dependent Mean       14.43606    Adj R-Sq     0.2243 




                                                     --Heteroscedasticity Consistent- 
                   Parameter   Standard                    Standard 
 Variable     DF   Estimate    Error      t Value Pr > |t|  Error    t Value  Pr > |t| 
 
 Intercept    1   13.48157     6.42101     2.10    0.0360   6.48967    2.08     0.0380 
 year01       1    0.86058     0.63748     1.35    0.1773   0.34560    2.49     0.0129 
 year02       1    0.72554     0.63838     1.14    0.2560   0.34362    2.11     0.0350 
 year03       1    0.79388     0.63825     1.24    0.2138   0.34538    2.30     0.0217 
 year04       1    0.85057     0.63912     1.33    0.1835   0.34628    2.46     0.0142 
 year05       1    0.79248     0.64300     1.23    0.2180   0.35512    2.23     0.0258 
 year06       1    1.02728     0.64110     1.60    0.1094   0.35406    2.90     0.0038 
 year07       1    0.96387     0.64242     1.50    0.1338   0.35502    2.72     0.0067 
 year08       1    1.17497     0.64346     1.83    0.0681   0.35600    3.30     0.0010 
 year09       1    1.01411     0.64359     1.58    0.1154   0.35804    2.83     0.0047 
 gplag        1    0.04795     0.00840     5.71    <.0001   0.00812    5.90     <.0001 
The Chi Square was significant at the 1% 
level, so there is heteroskedasticity in the 
model.  
To fix: Added ACOV to the Proc Reg  
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 yearinleagu  1    0.10853     0.00918    11.82    <.0001   0.01047   10.37     <.0001 
 Symmetry     1    0.02126     0.01112     1.91    0.0561   0.01166    1.82     0.0684 
 penydslag    1   -0.00208     0.00123    -1.69    0.0915   0.00124   -1.68     0.0930 
 sackydslag   1   -0.00277     0.00146    -1.90    0.0578   0.00159   -1.74     0.0814 
 draft1       1    0.44221     0.06068     7.29    <.0001   0.06221    7.11     <.0001 
 weight       1   -0.02230     0.04076    -0.55    0.5845   0.04073   -0.55     0.5842 
 weight2      1    0.0000347   0.00006387  0.54    0.5870   0.00006421 0.54     0.5890 
 center       1    0.03413     0.09588     0.36    0.7219   0.09168    0.37     0.7097 
 guard        1    0.12002     0.08836     1.36    0.1747   0.08892    1.35     0.1774 
 tackle       1    0.40786     0.08518     4.79    <.0001   0.08429    4.84     <.0001 
  
